Managers frequently cite the desire to mitigate asymmetric information as a motivation for increasing firm focus. The information benefits of focus appear relevant for the subset of firms that actually increase their focus; however, the relevance of focus-related information benefits for the population of diversified firms is an open question. This paper examines the relation between corporate diversification and asymmetric information proxies derived from analysts' forecasts and abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements. I find that greater diversification is not associated with increased asymmetric information. These results call into question the notion that corporate diversification strictly exacerbates information problems.
Introduction
Managers frequently cite the desire to mitigate asymmetric information as a motivation for increasing firm focus. 1 An implication of this motivation is that diversified firms are subject to larger asymmetric information problems than are focused firms. This conjecture, which I refer to as the transparency hypothesis, suggests that splitting a conglomerate firm along industry lines into separately traded and/or operated entities can mitigate the information asymmetries about each industry segment's profitability and operating efficiency that arise because the segments are part of a conglomerate. However, many more firms choose to remain diversified rather than to refocus (e.g., see Montgomery, 1994; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997a) .
One possible explanation is that corporate diversification is not strictly associated with an increase in asymmetric information. The aggregate nature of reported earnings for diversified firms could actually imply less potential for information asymmetry.
Assuming that the errors outsiders make in forecasting industry segment cash flows are imperfectly correlated across segments, the absolute value of the percentage error in the forecast of firm cash flows may be smaller for a diversified firm than for a focused firm.
In other words, even if the errors outsiders make in forecasting segment cash flows are larger than the errors they make in forecasting focused firm cash flows, if these errors are not perfectly positively correlated, then the consolidated forecast may be more accurate than a forecast for a focused firm. In effect, asymmetric information regarding each segment's performance is, in part, diversified away across segments. Consequently, the 1 Habib, Johsen, and Naik (1997) and Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2000) cite examples in which managers appeal to information benefits in justifying stock break-ups. Further, it seems as if focus has become a mantra of sorts among some executives and academics; e.g., see Bhide (1990) ; "Corporate degree to which the expectations of outsiders differ from managers' private information could be reduced. I refer to this possibility as the information diversification hypothesis.
Clearly, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Thus, I empirically examine the relation between corporate diversification and the degree of asymmetric information faced by outsiders. The tests use proxies for asymmetric information derived from analysts' forecasts and stock price reactions to earnings announcements.
Regressions explaining analysts' forecast errors and the dispersion among analysts'
forecasts reveal that greater diversification is associated with smaller forecast errors and less dispersion among forecasts, consistent with the information diversification effect.
However, after controlling for differences in the volatility of abnormal stock returns between diversified and focused firms (and, hence, any effect of diversification on the volatility of returns, earnings, etc.), diversification is associated with larger forecast errors and greater dispersion among forecasts, consistent with the transparency effect.
Given the difficulty in determining the magnitude of the reduction in diversified firms' volatility that stems directly from the information diversification effect, it is difficult to determine from the regression results which effect, if any, dominates. Thus, I
compare the forecast errors of diversified firms with those of similarly constructed portfolios of focused firms. This analysis, by construction, allows focused firms to realize any benefits of the information diversification effect without also incurring any of the costs associated with reduced transparency. However, I find that diversified firms' forecast errors are very similar in magnitude to those of their matching-firm portfolios.
Breakups Are No Panacea" by Roger Lowenstein (The Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1997); or "Confessions of a Corporate-Spinoff Junkie" by Roger Lowenstein (The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 1996) .
Finally, diversified firms are shown to have smaller revaluations associated with earnings announcements, consistent with outsiders being better able to anticipate the earnings of diversified firms. Additionally, diversified firms have slightly larger earnings response coefficients (ERCs), suggesting that new earnings information for diversified firms is capitalized into stock prices to a greater extent than new earnings information for focused firms. Taken together, the results in this paper call into question the notion that corporate diversification strictly exacerbates information problems for most firms.
Further, these results suggest that the firms most likely to realize information benefits from undertaking stock break-ups are those with particularly severe diversificationrelated transparency problems.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the sample and empirical design of the tests. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 offers a concluding discussion.
Hypotheses development and literature review
The degree of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders may differ for diversified versus focused firms. The source of the difference in asymmetry could be that diversified firms are less transparent than focused firms. For instance, while managers of diversified firms can observe divisional cash flows, outsiders can observe only noisy estimates of divisional cash flows. Thus, the mapping of divisional cash flows into consolidated earnings can be less than transparent to outsiders, and reported earnings will convey less value-relevant information. To the extent that accounting figures for 2 Diversification-related transparency problems could represent the inability of segments of diversified firms to attract industry specialist analysts as in Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2000) .
diversified firms are less transparent relative to those of focused firms, it is possible that asymmetric information problems are more severe for diversified firms.
In addition, diversified firms often operate in many different industries while individual financial analysts often specialize within one particular industry. Following a diversified firm will by definition take an analyst out of his or her area of expertise at least along some dimension. Thus, we might expect individual analysts to have greater difficulty in following diversified firms. Dunn and Nathan (1998) find that as the number of diversified firms a particular analyst follows increases, the accuracy of that analyst relative to other analysts declines. To the extent that the complexity of diversified firms might reduce the effectiveness of individual analysts in processing information about firms, larger information asymmetries between managers and investors could exist.
I refer to the idea that aggregated cash flows and other diversification-related information problems make it more difficult for analysts (outsiders) to forecast firm cash flows as the transparency hypothesis. The transparency hypothesis predicts that, compared with focused firms, diversified firms should have, all else equal, larger forecast errors, more dispersion among analysts' forecasts, larger revaluations around earnings announcements, and smaller ERCs. To the extent that they are less transparent than focused firms, diversified firms will face more difficulty in raising capital, less stock market liquidity, and, therefore, higher costs of capital. Managers of diversified firms could reduce the information gap by credibly increasing segment disclosure or by breaking up firms along industry lines into separately traded securities and/or separately operated firms. 3 Targeted stock allows parent companies to retain legal ownership of business segments while holders of targeted stock are entitled to the earnings stream of a particular business segment, e.g., see Zuta (1998) .
The benefits of increased disclosure have been examined extensively in previous literature (e.g., see Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms with more informative disclosure policies as measured by ratings from the Financial Analysts Foundation have larger analyst followings, less dispersion among individual analysts' forecasts, and less volatility in forecast revisions. Swaminathan (1991) finds that multiple-segment firms experienced increases in the accuracy of analysts' forecasts and decreases in the dispersion among analysts' forecasts subsequent to implementation of the SEC's line of business disclosure requirements. Piotroski (1999) finds that discretionary expansion of segment reporting is also, on balance, associated with an increase in analysts' forecast accuracy and a decrease in forecast dispersion. These findings are all consistent with increased disclosure reducing information asymmetries.
In addition to improving disclosure, managers can break up the conglomerate firm along industry lines into separately traded and/or operated entities to improve transparency. For instance, a frequently cited motivation for focus-increasing transactions and tracking stock issues is management's desire to make their companies easier for investors to evaluate. A direct implication of this rationale is that the potential for information asymmetry between managers and outsiders is greater for morediversified firms. Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997) present a model in which splitting a firm along industry lines into separately traded firms leads to more informative stock prices, in turn improving the quality of managers' investment decisions and reducing uninformed investors' uncertainty about asset values. Similarly, Nanda and Narayanan (1999) present a model of optimal corporate scope in which managers trade off the benefits of internal capital markets against diversification-related asymmetric information costs. Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2000) document increases in analysts' forecast accuracy and consensus for those firms that conduct stock break-ups, i.e., spinoffs, carveouts, or targeted stock offerings. These improvements appear to stem from the enhanced ability of the newly created focused entities to attract industry-specialist analysts. Zuta (1998) reports improved correspondence between the sum of segment cash flows and consolidated firm cash flows for diversified firms subsequent to targeted stock issues. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that, relative to control firms, diversified firms that conduct spinoffs have larger forecast errors, greater dispersion among forecasts, and larger revaluations around earnings announcements. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam also find that firms that engage in spin-offs subsequently raise more external capital than control firms. This finding is consistent with some firms conducting spinoffs in an effort to reduce asymmetric information prior to approaching capital markets.
While the stock break-up results provide evidence in support of the transparency hypothesis, it is important to recognize the potential limitations of these papers. First, all of these studies, by definition, consider only firms that change organizational form.
These are precisely the subsets of firms that would be expected to have suffered the greatest diversification-related information problems. Second, it is not clear whether the source of the reduction in information asymmetry is improved transparency. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997b) report that decreases in diversification are frequently associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover.
Thus, the improvements in asymmetric information proxies around break-ups could be due to the resolution of uncertainty regarding these events' potential impact on earnings.
By examining changes at the margin, these papers cannot address the fundamental question of how firm diversification and asymmetric information are related for the broad cross-section of firms that do not choose (or are not forced) to refocus or issue tracking stock (or diversify, for that matter). These papers suffer from a sample selection bias in this regard. Hence, the findings might not generalize beyond the respective samples.
Unlike previous research, this paper also explicitly recognizes the potential benefits of diversification in the context of analysts' forecast characteristics and reactions to earnings surprises. The aggregate nature of reported earnings for diversified firms could imply less potential for information asymmetry. For example, assuming that the errors outsiders make in forecasting industry segment cash flows are imperfectly correlated across segments, the absolute value of the percentage error in the forecast of firm cash flows may be smaller for a diversified firm than for a focused firm. In other words, even if the errors outsiders make in forecasting segment cash flows are larger than the errors they make in forecasting focused firm cash flows, if these errors are not perfectly positively correlated, then the consolidated forecast may be more accurate than a forecast for a focused firm. Consequently, the degree to which the expectations of outsiders differ from managers' private information could be reduced. Again, I term this possibility the information diversification hypothesis. Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) draw on similar reasoning to explain the information benefits of trading baskets of stocks rather than the individual stocks that constitute the baskets. They demonstrate that basket securities are subject to less asymmetric information (and, hence, adverse selection) precisely because their cash flows are aggregates. In effect, information asymmetries associated with each security are, in part, diversified away across the securities that constitute the basket.
Thus, information asymmetries are often lower for the basket security than for the individual securities constituting the basket. To the extent that diversified firms represent basket securities consisting of focused firms, these same arguments imply that diversified firms may be less subject to asymmetric information problems than focused firms.
This reasoning is consistent with anecdotal evidence in the financial press. For example, General Electric (GE) operates in many different industries, and a significant fraction of GE's assets are opaque financial assets. These factors should combine to make GE less transparent. However, Ben Zacks of Zacks Investment Research indicates that analysts' forecasts for GE actually fall in a "very, very tight range." While GE is known for providing "guidance" to analysts, individual analysts also appeal to the fact that GE is a well-diversified portfolio to explain the remarkable accuracy of and lack of dispersion among their forecasts for GE. Similarly, the recent Time Warner and America
Online merger illustrates the intuition behind the information diversification hypothesis.
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While analysts following the combined company are now charged with evaluating quite disparate businesses, the possibility that forecast errors across these businesses will "balance out" is advanced as a mitigating factor. Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) examine the relation between firm diversification and asymmetric information in the context of seasoned equity offerings. They find that equity issue announcements by diversified firms are met with significantly less-negative revaluations than announcements by focused firms. Haw, Jung, and Ruland (1994) find that analysts' forecast accuracy decreases for firms immediately subsequent to completing an acquisition but returns to pre-acquisition levels within several years.
However, the temporary reduction in accuracy is significantly less pronounced for the subset of diversifying acquisitions due to the reduction in post In sum, the information diversification hypothesis predicts that diversified firms should have smaller forecast errors, less dispersion among analysts' forecasts, smaller market reactions to earnings announcements, and larger ERCs than focused firms.
Data and empirical design

Description of sample
I draw my initial sample of analyst forecast and actual earnings data from I/B/E/S.
As the consensus forecast, I use the median forecast for earnings per share (EPS) reported for the month closest to, but preceding, the month in which actual earnings are released.
I require that each sample firm have a minimum of three analysts providing forecasts. Receipts (ADRs), and real estate investment trusts (REITs). From this sample, I then exclude those observations for which the absolute forecast error, defined as |actual EPSmedian forecast EPS|, exceeds 100% of the stock price five days before earnings are announced (e.g., see Ali, Klein, and Rosenfeld, 1992) . I also exclude those observations for which the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts is greater than 20% of the stock price.
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In order to obtain consistency between the stock prices (from CRSP) used as deflators and I/B/E/S EPS data, I restate actual and forecasted EPS using the I/B/E/S stock split adjustment factors to recover pre-split forecasts and actuals. Thus, the EPS data in my sample reflect the numbers reported when the forecasts were made, i.e., not adjusted for subsequent splits. A total of 12,282 forecast years remain after all screens. 
Diversification measure
I use an asset-based Herfindahl Index (HERF) as a measure of diversification.
This variable reflects the degree to which the assets of a firm are concentrated within its industry segments. For each firm, I calculate HERF as the sum of the squares of each reported segment's assets as a proportion of the firm's total assets. Thus, for firm i in year t, HERF is measured as
where N it is the number of reported segments of firm i at time t and TA jit are the assets attributable to segment j of firm i at time t. HERF equals one for all single-segment firms segment). To ensure the results are not driven by this criteria, I tried several other cutoffs (e.g., standard deviation greater than 10%, 25%, or 30% of stock price). The results are not sensitive to the criteria used. 6 Comment and Jarrell (1995) Easterwood and Nutt, 1999) . Additionally, Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin (1984) demonstrate that the errors in forecasts made very near to the end of a forecasting period consist primarily of firm-specific information rather than economy-or industry-wide information. These factors make forecasts very near the end of a forecasting period attractive as proxies for assessing differences in asymmetric information across firms.
As the primary measure of forecast accuracy, I use ERROR, which is the absolute difference between actual earnings and the median forecast deflated by the stock price five days before the earnings announcement date. Firms with larger differences in information asymmetry between managers and outsiders regarding firm earnings are expected to have larger forecast errors. DISPERSION is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts deflated by the stock price five days before the earnings announcement date. This variable is a measure of disagreement among analysts.
Disagreement could result from a lack of available information about a firm. Thus, greater disagreement among analysts' forecasts could imply larger information problems.
In order to examine the relation between diversification and information asymmetry, I regress forecast accuracy and dispersion on HERF. The transparency hypothesis predicts that higher HERF, or greater focus, should be associated with smaller forecast errors and less dispersion among forecasts. Alternatively, the information diversification hypothesis predicts that higher HERF should be associated with larger forecast errors and greater dispersion among forecasts.
In order to draw appropriate inferences from the forecast analysis, I also control for other factors that can impact forecast characteristics. For example, firm size can be expected to increase forecast accuracy and reduce forecast dispersion (e.g., see Atiase, 1985) . Thus, I include the book value of total assets (TA) at the end of the previous fiscal year.
As in Alford and Berger (1999) , I include a measure of stock return volatility (VOLATILITY), calculated as the standard deviation of the market model residuals over the period from 210 to 11 days before the earnings announcement date. The volatility of stock prices proxies for the amount of price-relevant information about a firm that arrives daily to the market. Alford and Berger argue that as volatility increases, the amount of price-relevant information that analysts must process also goes up and analysts' ability to forecast earnings declines. Thus, firms with higher volatility are expected to have larger forecast errors and more analyst disagreement. Given that diversified firms generally exhibit less volatility than focused firms (e.g., see Comment and Jarrell, 1995) , volatility differences between diversified and focused firms could in part reflect the information diversification effect described in Section 2. Thus, it will be important to account for the relation between volatility and diversification in interpreting the results below.
Analysts might face more difficulty in forecasting earnings for firms with a lot of potential growth options relative to firms whose values consist mainly of assets-in-place.
Thus, I also include in the analysis the ratio of R&D expense to sales (RDSALES) and the ratio of intangible assets to total assets at the previous fiscal year end (INTGTA).
9 Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (1998) conjecture that the level of analyst effort and, perhaps by extension, the quality of analysts' forecasts vary with the degree to which firm value is comprised of tangible assets.
Since leverage adds to the volatility of earnings, the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets (LEVG) is included. 10 Firms with higher leverage might be expected to have less-accurate forecasts and more dispersion among forecasts. I also include a binary variable (SALESDEV) that takes the value of one if the sum of segment sales is not within 1% of consolidated firm sales. This variable is intended to gauge the difficulty outsiders face in aggregating segment cash flows for diversified firms. More difficulty in mapping segment cash flows into consolidated cash flows may imply more analyst disagreement and less forecast accuracy. Dierkens (1991) argues that, all else equal, a strong market reaction to an earnings announcement of a given firm is an indication that the managers of that firm have released substantial private information and information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is large for that firm. Similarly, in models of time-varying asymmetric information, the periods immediately after earnings announcements are often characterized as being periods of low information asymmetry, consistent with the announcement eliminating much of the asymmetry that existed prior to the release. For example, Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) find that the stock price declines at announcements of seasoned equity offerings are increasing in the time since the last earnings release.
Price impact of earnings surprises
To assess the informativeness of earnings announcements for stock prices, I use event study methodology to estimate abnormal returns (ARs) for three-day windows centered on the annual earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S. In estimating the market model, I use the firm's daily returns and the returns on the CRSP value-weighted index over days -210 to -11 where day 0 is the earnings announcement date. Since I am primarily interested in the magnitude of the stock price response and not the direction, I
use the absolute abnormal return, |AR|, in the tests below.
I regress |AR| on HERF and other variables that could impact the market's reaction to an earnings announcement. The transparency hypothesis predicts larger reactions to earnings surprises for diversified firms relative to focused firms, or a negative relation between |AR| and HERF. This would be consistent with outsiders being better able to anticipate the earnings of focused firms. Alternatively, the information diversification hypothesis predicts a positive relation between |AR| and HERF. Clearly, the magnitude of the earnings surprise and the ex ante disagreement among analysts will influence the market's reaction. Thus, the forecast error and dispersion measures are included in the specifications. Larger differences between the market's expectations of earnings and actual earnings are expected to elicit bigger reactions from the market, i.e., larger ERCs as in Beaver, Clarke, and Wright (1979) . Greater disagreement among analysts is also expected to result in larger market reactions to earnings announcements.
I also include an interaction term of HERF and ERROR to assess the impact of diversification on the ERC. The transparency hypothesis would predict that focused firms should have earnings surprises that are capitalized to a greater extent into stock prices than the earnings surprises of diversified firms and, hence, a positive coefficient on the interaction term. Alternatively, the information diversification hypothesis would predict that the coefficient on the interaction term would be negative, consistent with earnings surprises of diversified firms being more value relevant.
The other variables used in the analysis to explain abnormal returns are drawn primarily from the ERC literature. Easton and Zmijewski (1989) , among others, demonstrate that constraining the coefficient on ERROR (i.e., the ERC) to be the same across all firms can lead to other explanatory variables having explanatory power only because they are correlated with the cross-sectional variation in the ERC. Thus, I include interaction terms of the ERC and controls for cross-sectional determinants of the ERC identified by the literature. Primary among these determinants are growth opportunities, firm size, and risk. As a proxy for the quality of investment opportunities, I include the market-to-book ratio (MB), defined as the ratio of the firm's market value (market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm's book value of total assets at the prior fiscal year-end. As a measure of firm size, I include market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year (MVE). Finally, I include the ratio of debt to total assets (LEVG) as a proxy for risk. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics grouped by whether the firm has multiple segments or a single segment. While the dispersion among analysts' forecasts is similar for single-and multiple-segment firms, the accuracy of the forecasts is quite different across firm type. The mean absolute forecast error is 3.71% of the stock price for multiple-segment firms and 4.59% for single-segment firms. Thus, analysts' earnings forecasts for multiple-segment firms are significantly more accurate than those for singlesegment firms. Further, the market's reaction to an earnings report is significantly larger for single-segment firms than for multiple-segment firms. The mean absolute abnormal return to an earnings announcement is 3.47% for a multiple-segment firm and 4.96% for a single-segment firm. Taken together, these results suggest larger information asymmetries for focused firms. However, in the tests below, I attempt to control for other potential differences between diversified and focused firms that could also affect information asymmetry but are ignored in these univariate comparisons.
Results
Univariate comparisons
While the multiple-segment firms in the sample exhibit varying levels of industry focus, the median HERF is 0.51. This roughly corresponds to a two-segment firm with 60% of its assets in one industry and 40% of its assets in another industry. Consistent with portfolio theory, multiple-segment firms have less volatility in abnormal returns.
Also, multiple-segment firms are generally larger than single-segment firms. Multiplesegment firms engage in less R&D as a percentage of sales, and, as in Lang and Stulz (1994) , multiple-segment firms have lower market-to-book ratios than single-segment firms. Multiple-segment firms also utilize more leverage than single-segment firms and report more intangible assets as a fraction of total assets. Finally, segment sales do not sum to within 1% of consolidated sales for nearly 11% of multiple-segment firm-years.
Forecast accuracy and dispersion regression results
The regression results using HERF to explain analysts' forecast errors are reported in Table 3 . In the first column of Table 3 , the only explanatory variable besides year dummies is HERF. The coefficient on HERF is positive and highly significant.
Thus, it appears that analysts' forecasts for focused firms are less accurate than for diversified firms. This is consistent with the information diversification hypothesis and inconsistent with the transparency hypothesis. Recall that these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Thus, a cautious interpretation of the positive coefficient on HERF is that the information diversification effect dominates the transparency effect in terms of the net effect on analysts' forecast accuracy.
Given the correlation between diversification and other firm characteristics documented in Table 2 , I introduce additional control variables that might influence analysts' forecast accuracy. In Column 2 of Table 3 , ln(TA) and RDSALES are added.
The negative coefficient on firm size is consistent with larger firms having smaller forecast errors. The level of R&D spending does not appear related to the accuracy of analyst's forecasts in this specification.
In Column 3 of Table 3 , LEVG is included. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant indicating that firms with higher leverage have less accurate analysts' forecasts. In Column 4 of Table 3 , the natural log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets and SALESDEV are included. Firms with more intangible assets appear to have more accurate analysts' forecasts as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on ln(1+INTGTA). Finally, firms whose segment cash flows do not sum to consolidated cash flows do not appear to have less accurate forecasts.
In Column 5 of Table 3 , the volatility measure is added. Volatility is an important determinant of forecast accuracy as evidenced by the dramatic increase in adjusted R 2 .
As expected, firms with greater volatility have larger forecast errors. Interestingly, the coefficient on HERF is now negative and significant. Note that Comment and Jarrell (1995) show that diversification helps to significantly reduce volatility. Hence, it is likely that a reduction in asymmetric information consistent with the information diversification effect described in Section 2 would partly manifest itself in the form of reduced stock return volatility. It should also be noted that the coefficients on firm size and R&D to sales also change sign when volatility is included in the specification.
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The results in Table 3 appear consistent with the following interpretation.
Diversification increases the accuracy of analysts' forecasts in part through its effect on volatility, but, after completely controlling for this effect, diversification decreases the accuracy of analysts' forecasts due to the transparency problems that accompany diversification. 11 Unfortunately, given that it is unclear how much of the reduction in volatility is solely due to diversification, it is difficult to conclude from Table 3 which effect, if any, dominates. However, it does appear that absent any significant reduction in volatility due to diversification, diversification is associated with larger forecast errors perhaps because of reduced transparency. Further examination of these effects is the focus of Section 4.3.
The regression results using HERF to explain dispersion among analysts' forecasts are reported in Table 4 . In the first column of Table 4 , the only explanatory variable besides year dummies is HERF. The coefficient on HERF is positive and highly significant. Since increases in HERF represent increases in focus, it appears that analysts' forecasts are more dispersed for focused firms than for diversified firms.
In Columns 2-4 of Table 4 , control variables with the exception of volatility are added. The controls affect dispersion among forecasts much as they affect forecast accuracy. The negative coefficient on firm size is consistent with larger firms having less forecast dispersion. Firms with higher R&D expenditures also have greater forecast dispersion. Firms with higher leverage have more dispersion among analysts' forecasts, 11 Dunn and Nathan (1998) report similar results. However, the authors interpret the coefficient on the diversification variable as evidence that diversified firms are subject to larger information asymmetries. This interpretation does not consider the documented benefit of diversification in terms of reduced volatility. Dunn and Nathan conjecture that the benefits of reduced volatility are only likely to be substantial in special cases where the correlation between divisional cash flows is negative. However, portfolio theory suggests these benefits are present anytime divisional cash flows are not perfectly positively correlated.
while firms with more intangible assets appear to have less dispersion among analysts'
forecasts. Finally, the mapping of segment cash flows into consolidated cash flows does not appear to influence the dispersion among analysts' forecasts. The coefficient on HERF remains positive and significant in each of these specifications.
In Column 5 of Table 4 , stock return volatility is added. As with the forecast accuracy results above, volatility is an important determinant of forecast dispersion as evidenced by the dramatic increase in adjusted R 2 . Firms with greater volatility have more dispersion among analysts' forecasts. The coefficient on HERF is negative and significant after completely controlling for volatility differences between diversified and focused firms. Again, absent any reduction in volatility accompanying diversification, diversification is associated with greater dispersion among analysts' forecasts. Note that the coefficient on firm size again changes sign after including volatility.
The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 
Forecast errors for similarly constructed portfolios of focused firms
The tests in Section 4.2 have several potential shortcomings. First, while the results are consistent with the intuitive conclusion that diversification alleviates information problems via a reduction in volatility while exacerbating information problems due to transparency, it is difficult to determine which effect, if any, dominates.
The primary difficulty lies in determining the magnitude of the reduction in stock return volatility that is directly attributable to corporate diversification. In essence, the regressions are comparing diversified firms, which are actually portfolios of focused firms, with individual stand-alone focused firms. Clearly, portfolio theory would predict that diversified firms should exhibit significantly less volatility than focused firms.
Second, there are no industry controls included. If diversified and focused firms tend to operate in businesses that have different levels of asymmetric information, then my diversification measure could simply be capturing industry differences. In light of the obvious difficulties of assigning a conglomerate to a particular industry, this problem cannot be adequately addressed via industry dummies.
In an effort to address these two weaknesses, I compare diversified firms with portfolios of focused firms that operate in similar industries during the same time period.
More specifically, I contrast the forecast errors of diversified firms with those of similarly constructed portfolios of focused firms. 13 This approach yields more powerful tests of the hypotheses.
subsamples is significant at the 1% level (t = -2.92). The increased frequency of management forecasts among focused firms should bias against finding support for the information diversification hypothesis. 13 I cannot perform the matching tests for dispersion among analysts' forecasts because these tests require the covariance of forecasts between each of the matching firms that constitute the portfolios.
The procedure for constructing these size-and industry-matched portfolios is as follows. For each year, I identify all the distinct industry segments of the multiplesegment firms. I then identify for each segment those focused firms in the sample that operate in the same industry (three-digit SIC code) as the segment during the same forecast year. I choose as a tentative match the focused firm that is in the same industry as the segment and is closest in size (assets) to the conglomerate. In order to obtain a reasonable tradeoff between industry and size matching, I impose the condition that the assets of the matching firm must be within 25% of the assets of the conglomerate. If such a match is not found at the three-digit SIC code level, I choose among the possible matching firms at the two-digit level. If the size criterion is not met at the two-digit level, then the segment goes unmatched.
I have also matched the segments of conglomerates to focused firms that are similar to the segments in terms of both industry and size. The mean (median) difference between conglomerate forecast errors and matching-firm portfolio errors is -0.79% (-0.66%) and this difference is significant at the 1% (1%) level. Thus, the data appear to be inconsistent with the transparency hypothesis. However, the well-documented negative relation between firm size and analysts' forecast errors confounds this interpretation.
This alternative matching algorithm does have the advantage of explicitly recognizing that breaking up a conglomerate will result in a portfolio of generally smaller pure-play firms that will no longer benefit from any advantages of being part of a larger firm (e.g., more press coverage). However, the average matching firm under this algorithm is much smaller than the conglomerate; the mean ratio of conglomerate size to matching-firm size is 0.39. Further, any attempt to control for size differences between conglomerates and the firms constituting the matching-firm portfolios is made difficult by the strong correlation between measures of these size differences and measures of diversification.
Thus, I report below the results based on matching the segments of the conglomerates with focused firms that are in similar industries as the segments but are similar in size to the conglomerates.
The 3,814 multiple-segment firm-years in the sample include 10,620 distinct segment-years. Suitable matches are available for 5,869 of these segment-years.
However, only 1,418 multiple-segment firm-years have each of their respective industry segments matched with a focused firm of appropriate size and industry affiliation. 
14 I lose 2,396 multiple-segment firm years because a suitable match could not be found for all segments. I compare firms with all segments matched to firms missing matches for at least one segment and find no significant differences in terms of forecast errors or absolute abnormal returns around earnings announcements. However, firms with all segments matched are smaller in terms of asset size and report fewer segments on average than firms without matches for all segments. Additionally, I run the specifications from Tables 3 and 4 on the 1,418 conglomerate firm-years that have all segments matched. The results using this subsample are similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4. where w i is the ratio of segment i's assets to the sum of segment assets, MFERROR i is the matching-firm forecast error as a percentage of stock price, and the summation is over the N segments of the diversified firm. Thus, PFLERR is the absolute value of the weighted average of the signed forecast errors of matching firms, where the weights are the sizes of the segments relative to the size of the conglomerate. By taking weighted averages of the signed matching-firm forecast errors, the matching-firm forecast errors can offset each other if they are of opposite sign and thereby reduce the overall matchingfirm portfolio forecast error. Consistent with this information diversification effect, the mean absolute forecast error for the matching firms separately is 4.98% while the mean absolute forecast error for the portfolios formed with these matching firms (i.e., PFLERR) is 4.61%. Thus, allowing signed errors to partially offset each other results in a 0.37% reduction in average absolute forecast errors.
The transparency hypothesis predicts that, all else equal, the forecast error for a similarly constructed portfolio of focused firms would be smaller than that of the diversified firm. In other words, allowing errors to cancel out across focused firms simulates the benefits of the information diversification effect that conglomerate firms might enjoy, without introducing any of the transparency problems that might produce larger forecast errors for segments of conglomerates. Similarly, one can view PFLERR as an approximation of the overall forecast error a firm could expect if it issued targeted stock for each business segment, since each segment would then have to prepare separate GAAP conforming financial statements (e.g., see D'Souza and Jacob, 2000) . 15 The information diversification hypothesis predicts that, all else equal, the forecast error for a portfolio of focused firms would be very similar to that of the diversified firm. Table 5 reports the comparisons of diversified firms' forecast errors and PFLERR.
Due to skewness in the distributions, medians are emphasized. Consistent with the information diversification hypothesis, diversified firms have median forecast errors that are very similar in magnitude to those of their matching-firm portfolios. Recall that by matching conglomerates' segments with focused firms each as large as the conglomerate, I have stacked the deck in favor of the transparency effect. Thus, these findings are strongly inconsistent with the transparency hypothesis.
Surprisingly, diversified firms have mean forecast errors that are smaller in magnitude than those of their matching-firm portfolios. However, given that I match on size and industry, I am by design not controlling for several other firm characteristics known to affect forecast errors (e.g., see Table 3 ). Thus, I compare the differences between conglomerates and their matching firms in terms of R&D expense, leverage, intangible assets, and volatility. Differences in R&D expenditures, leverage, and intangible assets are calculated as the differences between conglomerates and their matching-firm portfolios along these dimensions. Matching-firm portfolio R&D expenditures, leverage, and intangible assets are the weighted averages of these variables for the matching firms, where the weights are the respective sizes of the segments relative to the conglomerates. Differences in volatility are measured as the difference between the standard deviation of the market model residuals for a conglomerate and for its matching-firm portfolio. The market models for both the conglomerate and its matchingfirm portfolio are estimated over the 252 days preceding the conglomerate's fiscal year-end. Matching-firm portfolio returns are the weighted average returns of the matching firms where the weights are the respective sizes of the segments relative to the conglomerate.
Matching-firm portfolios have significantly higher R&D expenditures and lower leverage and intangibles. Also, conglomerates have a mean (median) abnormal return volatility of 2.21% (1.97%) while the matching-firm portfolios have a mean (median) volatility of 2.16% (1.93%); and the differences are not statistically significant.
Regressions (unreported) of the differences between conglomerates' forecast errors and those of their matching-firm portfolios against HERF and differences between conglomerates and their matching-firm portfolios in terms of size, volatility, R&D, leverage, and intangibles do not reveal any significant relation between diversification and forecast error differences after controlling for these factors. Thus, the reported mean difference in forecast errors in Table 5 appears to be driven by differences between conglomerates and their matching-firm portfolios along dimensions not controlled for by the matching algorithm. Note that the results of Table 5 are robust to several changes in the matching procedures, e.g., relaxing the size screen and/or allowing segment matches at the one-digit SIC code level.
Price impact of earnings surprises regression results
The regression results using HERF to explain absolute abnormal returns around earnings announcements are reported in Table 6 . In the first column of Table 6 , the only explanatory variable besides year dummies is HERF. The coefficient on HERF is positive and highly significant. Since increases in HERF represent increases in focus, abnormal returns around earnings announcements are significantly larger for focused firms than for diversified firms. As in Dierkens (1991) , larger reactions to earnings announcements by focused firms can indicate that the managers of focused firms have released substantial private information and that information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders are larger for focused firms than for diversified firms.
Given the correlation between diversification and other firm characteristics documented in Table 2 , additional control variables that could influence earnings announcement abnormal returns are introduced in Columns 2 and 3. In Column 2, ERROR (defined earlier as the absolute difference between actual and forecast earnings, deflated by the stock price five days before the earnings announcement date) and DISPERSION (the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts, deflated by the stock price five days before the earnings announcement date) are added. The coefficient on ERROR (i.e., the ERC) is positive and significant consistent with bigger earnings surprises eliciting larger abnormal returns. The coefficient on DISPERSION is also positive and significant.
In Column 3 of Table 6 , I add the interaction terms intended to control for the determinants of the ERC. The coefficient on HERF remains positive and significant, consistent with larger reactions to earnings announcements by focused firms. Also, the coefficient on the product of ERROR and HERF is negative, indicating that greater diversification is associated with slightly larger ERCs. One interpretation of these results is that it is easier for outsiders to forecast the earnings of diversified firms and, when managers of diversified firms reveal actual earnings, this new information is capitalized in the stock price to a greater extent than the earnings surprises of focused firms. As previously documented in the ERC literature, firms with better growth opportunities have higher ERCs while larger firms, firms with greater leverage (risk), and firms with greater dispersion among analysts' forecasts have lower ERCs (e.g., see Collins and Kothari, 1989; Teoh and Wong, 1993) .
I assess the robustness of the reported regression results by replicating the regressions for various subsamples of the data (e.g., diversified firms, firms that survive at least five years, firms above/below median size, firms that do not issue management forecasts, etc.). Also, to mitigate potential problems with errors being cross-sectionally correlated, I estimate the regression equations using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. Finally, rather than absolute abnormal returns, I use squared abnormal returns. The primary advantage of this approach is that squared VOLATILITY could be used as a weight in a weighted least squares regression. The results using these alternative approaches are similar to those reported in Table 6 . 
Conclusion
While improved transparency is an oft-cited and potentially relevant benefit of increased focus, I find that, on balance, diversified firms do not exhibit higher levels of asymmetric information than focused firms. This relation holds over time and after controlling for other factors expected to affect asymmetric information. These results suggest that while transparency is a concern for some conglomerates, it is by no means a general problem.
My results can help to shed some light on a nagging question associated with the corporate diversification literature, namely, why so many firms remain diversified in light of the evidence that diversification appears to be, on average, a value-reducing strategy. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997b) appeal to problems associated with the separation of ownership and control. However, information concerns certainly could impact a firm's choice to remain diversified rather than refocus. The findings of this paper could in part explain the reluctance of many diversified firms to pursue a more focused organizational form.
firms have significantly smaller increases in return variance around earnings announcements than focused firms. This is consistent with conglomerates' earnings being easier to forecast than those of focused firms.
Table 1 Sample Characteristics
This sample includes firms with analyst forecast and earnings data available from I/B/E/S for fiscal years ending between July 1985 and June 1996. Firms must be followed by at least three analysts and also have data available from Compustat and CRSP. Firms with reported business segments that are regulated utilities (SIC codes between 4800-4829 and 4910-4949) or financial services operations (SIC codes between 6000-6999) are excluded, as are foreign firms, ADRs, and REITs. Additionally, observations for which the absolute forecast error, |actual-median forecast|, is greater than 100% of the stock price or for which the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts is greater than 20% of the stock price are also excluded. Industries in Panel B are defined using three-digit SIC codes.
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics by Firm-Type
All I/B/E/S forecast data are for the month closest to, but preceding, the annual earnings announcement. ERROR is the absolute forecast error, |actual-median forecast|, scaled by the firm's stock price five days before the earnings announcement. DISPERSION is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts scaled by the firm's stock price five days before the earnings announcement. |AR| is the absolute value of the abnormal return for a three-day window centered on the earnings announcement date calculated from a market model estimated over the period from 210 to 11 days before the earnings announcement date. HERF is the asset-based Herfindahl Index. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of market model residuals over the period from 210 to 11 days before the earnings announcement date. TA is the total assets reported at the previous fiscal year-end in millions of dollars. MVE is the market value of a firm's equity at the end of the previous fiscal year in millions of dollars. RDSALES is the ratio of R&D expense to sales at the previous fiscal year-end. MB is the ratio of the firm's market value (market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm's book value of total assets at the prior fiscal year-end. LEVG is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. INTGTA is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets at the previous fiscal year-end. SALESDEV is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the sum of segment sales is not within 1% of consolidated firm sales for the previous fiscal year. Differences in medians are assessed using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
Table 3 Panel Regressions of Analysts' Forecast Errors on Firm Characteristics
The dependent variable is ERROR, the absolute forecast error, |actual-median forecast|, scaled by the firm's stock price five days before the earnings announcement. HERF is the asset-based Herfindahl Index. Ln(TA) is the natural log of total assets reported at the previous fiscal year-end. RDSALES is the ratio of R&D expense to sales at the previous fiscal year-end. LEVG is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. Ln(1+INTGTA) is the natural log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets at the previous fiscal year-end. SALESDEV is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the sum of segment sales is not within 1% of consolidated firm sales for the previous fiscal year. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of market model residuals over the period from 210 to 11 days before the earnings announcement date. The regressions also include dummy variables for years 1986-1995. The estimated coefficients for the year dummies are not reported below. T-statistics based on the White-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses (N=12,282).
Regression
(1) 
Table 4 Panel Regressions of Dispersion Among Analysts' Forecasts on Firm Characteristics
The dependent variable is DISPERSION, the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts scaled by the firm's stock price five days before the earnings announcement. HERF is the asset-based Herfindahl Index. Ln(TA) is the natural log of total assets reported at the previous fiscal year-end. RDSALES is the ratio of R&D expense to sales at the previous fiscal year-end. LEVG is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. Ln(1+INTGTA) is the natural log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets at the previous fiscal year-end. SALESDEV is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the sum of segment sales is not within 1% of consolidated firm sales for the previous fiscal year. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of market model residuals over the period from 210 to 11 days before the earnings announcement date. The regressions also include dummy variables for years 1986-1995. The estimated coefficients for the year dummies are not reported below. T-statistics based on the White-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses (N=12,282).
Regression
(1) 1,418 multiple-segment firm-years with conglomerate size and segment industry matched focused firms for each segment-year are included in the analysis below. ERROR is the absolute forecast error, |actual earnings-median forecast|, scaled by the firm's stock price five days before the earnings announcement. PFLERR= |∑w i *MFERROR i | where w i is the ratio of segment i's assets to the sum of segment assets, MFERROR i is the value of the matching firm forecast error as a percentage of stock price, and the summations are over the N segments of each diversified firm. Thus, PFLERR is the absolute value of a weighted average of the signed forecast errors of matching firms where the weights are the respective sizes of the segments relative to the conglomerate. Differences in medians are assessed using a median scores test and the differences in means are assessed using a Wilcoxon sign-rank test.
Table 6 Panel Regressions of Earnings Announcement Abnormal Returns on Firm Characteristics
The dependent variable is |AR|, the absolute abnormal return for the three-day window centered on the earnings announcement date calculated using a market model over the period 210 to 11 days before the announcement. HERF is the asset-based Herfindahl Index. ERROR is the absolute forecast error, |actual earnings-median forecast|, scaled by the firm's stock price five days before the earnings announcement. DISPERSION is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts scaled by the firm's stock price five days before the earnings announcement. Ln(MB) is the natural log of the ratio of the firm's market value (market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm's book value of total assets at the prior fiscal year-end. Ln(MVE) is natural log of the market value of a firm's equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. LEVG is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. The regressions also include dummy variables for years 1986-1995. The estimated coefficients for the year dummies are not reported below. T-statistics based on the Whiteadjusted standard errors are in parentheses (N=12,282).
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